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Not from Guile but from Entitlement: Lawful
Opportunism Capitalizes on the Cracks in
Contracts
GASTÓN DE LOS REYES, JR.† & KIRSTEN MARTIN‡
ABSTRACT
Few concepts have been more pivotal to contract law scholarship
over the last forty years than the opportunism attributed ex ante
and ex post to contracting parties, yet the lawful form of
opportunism identified by Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson in
1991 remains surprisingly overlooked in favor of the blatant forms
of opportunism that result from “self-interest seeking with guile.”
This Article extends Williamson’s inchoate account of lawful
opportunism and reports the first empirical study of the
phenomenon.
The conceptual analysis of lawful opportunism is developed with
reference to the bargaining underlying the classic impossibility
decision, Taylor v. Caldwell. Three component elements are shown
when combined to open “cracks” in contracts that tempt lawful
opportunism: (1) the background doctrine of literal enforcement
plus (2) a highly consequential disturbance that (3) strikes at the
naïveté of the bargain. Because lawful opportunism leverages the
legal entitlement to sue for breach of contract, its efficacy
presupposes the counterparty’s express awareness, which makes
the concept categorically different from the blatant forms of
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opportunism prevalent in the scholarship. This premise grounds the
Article’s conclusion that the defining character of lawful
opportunism is a strong enough sense of entitlement to choose to
openly press for damages based on the letter of contract,
notwithstanding the potentially punishing consequences to the
counterparty of doing so under the circumstances.
The empirical study reported in this Article was designed to
explore the individual-level factors that motivate participants to
resort to lawful opportunism rather than cooperative—or blatantly
opportunistic—alternatives. Our findings show, inter alia, that
participants who viewed themselves as more entitled (the top 25%
of all participants) were three times more likely to choose a lawfully
opportunistic behavior in the crack of the contract. Lawful
opportunism springs from a sense of entitlement, the way guile
fuels blatant opportunism.

INTRODUCTION
Today’s leading theories of economic governance
converge on the premise that humans frequently interact
with each other strategically,1 as game theory would suggest,
and also opportunistically, bending or breaking rules to their
advantage.2 The seminal rendering of the concept is given by
Nobel Laureate3 Oliver Williamson. The opportunism that
grounds his theory of transaction cost economics is defined
as “self-interest seeking with guile,” where guile refers to
“incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, [and]
especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise,
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.”4

1. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 25–26 (1975) (describing the various branches of the
“decision-tree” that can be considered before contracting) (citing THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960), and ERVING GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC
INTERACTION (1969)).
2. Williamson clarifies that in his model humans need not always act
opportunistically, just often enough to impact the governance forms that are
selected and succeed (or fail). Id. at 27; see also Barak D. Richman & Jeffrey T.
Macher, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in
the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1, 4 (2008).
3. See generally Peter E. Earl & Jason Potts, A Nobel Prize for Governance
and Institutions: Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom, 23 REV. POL. ECON. 1
(2011).
4. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

OF

CAPITALISM:
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Few concepts have been more pivotal to contract law
scholarship over the last forty years than the opportunism
attributed ex ante and ex post to contracting parties.5 The
observed and presumed tendency to act opportunistically
through “calculated efforts . . . to mislead, renege, cheat or
otherwise take advantage of the vulnerabilities of . . . trading
partners,”6 has been invoked to make sense of the entire
warp and woof of the subject. Parties are said to make
contracts to forestall opportunism,7 and contracts are said to
break down for failing to do so.8 Courts of law and, especially,
equity are seen to have evolved the doctrines they did to
counteract opportunism,9 and decade after decade scholars
have called on courts to mitigate opportunism in
contracting.10
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985).
5. See id.; see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Lexical Opportunism and the Limits
of Contract Theory, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 217, 230 (2016) (attributing to Williamson
“the importation of opportunism into law professors’ theoretical discussions”).
6. Richman & Macher, supra note 2, at 4.
7. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The
Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 271–76 (1991);
see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1989); D. Gordon Smith
& Brayden G. King, Contracts As Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009).
But see Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 227 (doubting the extent to which contract
actually limits opportunism).
8. See Ian Macneil, Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective
of Incomplete Contract Theory, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 107, 116 (2001); Alan Schwartz
& Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J.
541, 545–46 (2003); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits
of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390 (1993); see also Timothy J.
Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521,
523–25 (1981).
9. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of
Opportunism 3–7 (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617413 (discussing the
development of the “equitable safety valve” as a protection against opportunism).
10. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979) (assessing the
extent to which basic governance structures produce or address problems arising
from transaction costs and opportunism); see also George M. Cohen, The
Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 1016
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Self-interest seeking with guile comes in many flavors;
every one presupposes a covertness without which the
opportunistic gambit would go nowhere. Consider the
following anecdotes:
Anecdote 1. A bank has an agreement with a client to provide
checking account services in exchange for a fee and/or minimum
deposits. The bank adds additional services to the client account
without notice or permission, and deducts the corresponding fees
from the client’s checking account.11
Anecdote 2. A customer pays a down payment to a builder. The
builder skips town with the down payment.12

Anecdote 1 is modeled on the recent Wells Fargo scandal.
This “too big to fail” bank,13 between 2009 and 2016, drew
funds from the millions of fake accounts its agents opened,
without the request of its unsuspecting customers, because
the customers were unsuspecting.14 By the same token, the
builder in Anecdote 2 who converts the down payment gets
to take the cash because the client did not suspect the scheme
afoot.15 These two examples epitomize the forward-looking
(1992); Muris, supra note 8; Smith, supra note 9.
11. This example is based on the recent Wells Fargo scandal. See generally
Merric Kaufman, “Lions Hunting Zebras”: The Wells Fargo Fake Accounts
Scandal and its Aftermath, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 434 (2017).
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (6th ed. 2003). The
opportunistic acts in these examples are morally objectionable in a blatant and
uncontroversial way. Moreover, detection of the opportunism is unmistakable
once the damages (viz., bogus fees/lost deposits) are traced to the opportunist’s
plot.
13. Catherine Gallagher Fauver, The Long Journey to “Adequate”: Wells
Fargo’s Resolution Plan, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 647, 647–48 (2017) (noting
that Wells Fargo is among the banks deemed “too big to fail” under the DoddFrank Act that are, therefore, subject to “living will” requirements).
14. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently
Opening Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html.
15. To be certain, opportunism may also manifest subtly so as to obscure
detection, sometimes making linkage to the willful breach of the agent who seeks
to extract, rather than infuse, value all but impossible to establish conclusively.
There is nevertheless a categorical, even if forgivable, wrong effected by the
person who intentionally shirks effort in the discharge of contract terms that,
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dissembling which is the hallmark of the blatant form of
opportunism that Williamson’s first book, Markets and
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications,16 helped
make central to theorizing in contract law.17
suppose, pay by the hour. The difference with the Wells Fargo breach and the
take-the-money-and-run case is that the inherent covertness of shirking
(shirking declared in advance ceases to be shirking) masks the damages too,
making detection, if any, contested if not constructive, unless confessed. See
WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 47.
16. See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 1. The fundamental research
inquiry motivating Williamson’s field-changing contributions with transaction
cost economics is making sense of why human productive activity—the way we
pursue economic transactions—should be governed in different ways. The puzzle
framed in his breakthrough book is understanding why economic activity gets
organized within hierarchical governance structures that employ workers
(corporations) rather than through open market exchange.
This dichotomy is based on Ronald Coase’s seminal 1937 article, The Nature
of the Firm, and its core insight that the existence of “firms” (hierarchies) not
built on the “price mechanism” (markets) is explained by the transaction cost
implications of repeatedly transacting through the price mechanism. See
generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For
example, Coase points out “the difficulty of forecasting” as a key consideration
that funnels economic activity towards the open-ended realm of master-servant
relations: “the longer the period of the contract is for . . . the less possible, and
indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other
contracting party is expected to do.” Id. at 391. Williamson chooses to build upon
Coase’s project of “assign[ing] of transactions to one mode or another,” sharing
the view that human rationality is inherently bounded (as in the difficulty of
forecasting), and also finding it “to be intrinsically interesting.” WILLIAMSON,
supra note 1, at 8–9.
Williamson’s main argument in Markets and Hierarchies is that while
markets with large numbers of participants serve as a check on the opportunistic
tendencies of humans in business, this cleansing of opportunism eludes “smallnumbers” bargaining contexts, as with parties who transact repeatedly with each
other. Id. at 9–10 (observing that “a small-numbers supply condition effectively
obtains at the contract renewal interval”). Internal organization displaces the
risk of opportunism that obtains in the small-numbers bargaining context by
replacing the contract intervals that become sites for opportunism with the
institution of ongoing employment. See id. at 10, 25–26.
17. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing
and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1150 n.32 (1979) (citing
Markets and Hierarchies, inter alia, for its “general concept of opportunism”);
Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 155 & n.80 (1977) (citing Markets and
Hierarchies for what “might lead to an increase in opportunistic behavior”);
Benjamin Klein, et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
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In the voluminous literature that has ensued—not only
in law18 but also in economics,19 management,20 and
organization theory21—scholars have plumbed the manysided depths of opportunism conceptualized as self-interest

Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 & n.2 (1978) (citing
Markets and Hierarchies for its discussion of “opportunistic behavior”); see also
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, VA. L. REV.
1089, 1101 (1981) (quoting Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) for his
definition of opportunism).
18. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing
Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 119 (2017); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A
Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2014);
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A
Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 672 (2010); see also Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A
Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 632 (1993)
(providing business-related analysis); Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 230.
19. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12, at 93 (providing economic analysis); see
also Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trust, Communication and Contracts:
An Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 106 (2009).
20. See, e.g., Ranjay Gulati & Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation:
Managing Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances,
43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 781 (1998); Derek J. Harmon, et. al., Breaking the Letter vs.
Spirit of the Law: How the Interpretation of Contract Violations Affects Trust and
the Management of Relationships, 36 STRAT. MGMT. J. 497 (2015); Fabrice
Lumineau & James E. Henderson, The Influence of Relational Experience and
Contractual Governance on the Negotiation Strategy in Buyer-Supplier Disputes,
30 J. OPERATION MGMT. 382 (2012); Deepak K. Malhotra & Fabrice Lumineau,
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract
Structure 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 981 (2011); Jeffrey J. Reuer & Africa Ariño, Strategic
Alliance Contracts: Dimensions and Determinants of Contractual Complexity, 28
STRAT. MGMT. J. 313 (2007); Libby Weber & Kyle J. Mayer, Designing Effective
Contracts: Exploring the Influence of Framing and Expectations, 36 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 53 (2011); Libby Weber & Kyle J. Mayer, Transaction Cost Economics and
the Cognitive Perspective: Investigating the Sources and Governance of
Interpretive Uncertainty, 39 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 344 (2014); Valery Pavlov & Elena
Katok, Fairness and Supply Chain Coordination Failures (March 16, 2016)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
https://www.researchgate.net
/publication/292374227_Fairness_and_supply_chain_coordination_failures_on_t
he_optimality_of_a_pooling_contract).
21. See, e.g., Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, The Effects of Contracts
on Interpersonal Trust, 47ADMIN. SCI. Q. 534 (2002); Deepak Malhotra &
Francesca Gino, The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside
Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships, 56 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 559 (2011).
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seeking with guile (henceforth, “blatant” opportunism). 22
What theorists (of all fields) have nevertheless overlooked,
and contract law scholarship has yet to expressly incorporate
into its conceptual canon, is the novel species of “lawful”
opportunism that Williamson identified as part of his 1991
revamping of transaction cost economics.23
Lawful opportunism is the chief transaction cost concern
that Williamson highlights in accounting for a third “mode”
of governance to complement the markets and hierarchies
that titled his first book.24 “Hybrid” governance, as termed
22. The “blatant” versus “lawful” distinction owes to marketing scholars the
one published article known to the authors that expands upon Williamson’s
account of lawful opportunism. Kenneth H. Wathne & Jan B. Heide,
Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions, 64 J.
MARKETING 36, 37–38 (2000). Wathne and Heide propose to categorize lawful
opportunism as hold-up generally, ignoring the case of a highly consequential
disturbance under literal enforcement that sets forth Williamson’s account. Id.
at 38–40; compare id., with Williamson, supra note 7, at 271–73; see also
WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 47; Richman & Macher, supra note 2.
23. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 269 (defining hybrid governance); id. at
271–73 (discussing contract law and lawful opportunism). While Williamson did
not define “hybrid governance” as the third basic mode of governance until 1991,
his earlier work contains variant versions of the trichotomy of modes and reflects
his abiding concern with relational contracting. See Williamson, supra note 10,
at 248–50 (distinguishing “market governance,” “trilateral governance,” and
“transaction-specific governance”). New to Discrete Structural Alternatives is
Williamson’s articulation of literal enforcement and excuse doctrine as the
contingent doctrinal representations of the institutions of off-market, armslength governance. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 273, 290–91; see also infra
Section I.C. It is this perspective that reveals the transaction costs of lawful
opportunism, whose mitigation motivates the Article’s research question.
24. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 281 tbl.1; Rudolf Richter, The Role of Law
in the New Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 13, 26–27 (2008)
(reviewing Williamson’s three-mode conception of governance); see also
discussion supra note 23. This analysis was part of Williamson’s effort to
formalize the “discrete structural analysis” that distinguishes the institutional
logic of transaction cost economics.
Discrete structural analysis is distinguished with the mainstream of
economics and “its central core of price theory, and its central concern with
quantities of commodities and money.” Williamson, supra note 7, at 270 (quoting
Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 6–7 (1978)); see also Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 230 (“Oliver
Williamson and others[] were dissatisfied with how little the classical focus on
price and output decisions explained the origin and function of markets and
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by Williamson, comprises the off-the-market, customized,
negotiated, and yet arms-length transactions that
organizations and people pursue jointly without the
advantages of a price mechanism25 to standardize terms over
large numbers of participants.26 This is the realm of freely
negotiated relations and dealings, and the contract law that
provides its institutional foundation is the common law of
contracts from a typical first-year Contracts course. These
deals are not the sales contracts governed by the Uniform

structures within them—employment relationship, make or buy decisions,
corporate horizontal and vertical integrations, and so on.”). The mainstream
approach to economics leads to “a highly quantitative analysis, in which
equilibration at the margin plays a central role,” Williamson, supra note 7, at
270, an approach frequently adopted by law and economics scholars who pose
research questions as optimization problems (e.g., what is the optimal level of
corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their
employees?, see Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given
the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 INT. REV. L.
& ECON. 203 (1997)). Professor Shavell’s scholarship is illustrative in being
broadly framed thus. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law
Enforcement, 36 J. L. & ECON. 255 (1993); Steven Shavell, Optimal Discretion in
the Application of Rules, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 175 (2007); A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability
of Fines, 35 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1992). In contrast to optimization problems,
discrete structural analysis inquires after the variant institutional means—the
distinctive modes of governance and their contingent institutional
underpinnings—through which economic transactions may be pursued by
conceptualizing their characteristic virtues and vices “in the ‘main case,’ which is
not to be confused with the only case.” Williamson, supra note 7, at 286. In
addition, “each viable form of governance . . . is defined by a syndrome of
attributes that bear a supporting relation to one another. Many hypothetical
forms of organization never arise, or quickly die out, because they combine
inconsistent features.” Id. at 271. This Article drills down to probe the syndrome
of lawful opportunism that, according to Williamson, contract law engenders in
hybrid governance.
25. Cf. Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (discussing the decentralized nature of economic decision
making based on dispersed information).
26. Williamson’s ensuing analysis focuses on hybrid governance executed
through long-term governance forms. For the reasons discussed infra in notes 42
and 44, this Article looks to examples of off-market transactions that are one-shot
deals because these structures are highly vulnerable to the lawful opportunism
that Williamson characterizes with his eyes on ongoing forms of joint venture.
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Commercial Code,27 the contractual relations covered by
employment law,28 or the boilerplate that causes so many
conceptual difficulties in consumer law.29 Rather, this is the
domain of free contract, where “the principle of private
autonomy”30 continues to hold sway.
In Williamson’s treatment, contracts become susceptible
to lawful opportunism “[a]s disturbances become highly
consequential . . . [and] the ‘lawful’ gains to be had by
insistence upon literal enforcement exceed the discounted
value of continuing the exchange relationship.”31 Beyond this
cost-benefit tipping point, the worry—for Williamson as a
theorist and for entrepreneurs and managers as contracting
parties—is that “strict enforcement would have truly
punitive consequences . . . resulting [in] ‘injustice’ . . .
supported by (lawful) opportunism.”32
To appreciate the difference between guileful
opportunism (Anecdotes 1 and 2) and its lawful kin, 33
consider the following anecdotes featuring strict enforcement
with arguably punishing judgments of enforcement:
Anecdote 3. A tenant leases land from a landlord for four years,
without addressing obligations if the tenant cannot occupy the land.
After the first annual payment, the tenant is driven from the land
by an occupying army during a civil war and ceases payments. The

27. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977)
(requiring certain sales of goods valued at $500 or more be in writing).
28. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 153–55 (5th ed. 2014).
29. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012).
30. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941).
31. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273.
32. Id.
33. There is a strong family resemblance between Williamson’s lawful
opportunism and the “lexical opportunism” discussed by Professor Lipshaw. See
Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 219 (defining lexical opportunism as cases where the
“interpretation [of the written terms of the deal] creates a potential for staggering
liability beyond all common sense”).
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landlord sues the tenant for the missing lease payments.34
Anecdote 4. A concert promoter and a theater owner agree that the
promoter will pay $100 per night to rent the venue for four nights,
without addressing what happens if the owner cannot provide the
theater. The theater burns down, and both parties suffer economic
losses. The promoter sues to recover its specific investments
(promotional expenses), claiming breach of contract. 35
Anecdote 5. A-Corp is building a power plant and requires
environmental emissions credits. A-Corp enters into a deal to
purchase the required credits from B-Corp, without addressing
what happens if B-Corp cannot deliver the credits. B-Corp’s credits
are revoked by the regulator, and the trading price for the needed
credits more than doubles. A-Corp sues B-Corp for the increase in
price.36

The actions taken by the plaintiff-parties to realize
damage awards in these examples are not defined by (and do
not require) trickery or deception, as with the first set of
anecdotes. On the contrary, since the conduct amounts to the
pressing of legal entitlements to recover a damage award—
whether through oral demands or the filing of a complaint—
the counterparty’s express awareness is a precondition to the
efficacy of the exercise.
What drives parties to act in lawfully opportunistic
ways?37 Williamson’s high-level sketch demarcates the
34. This example is based on Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.).
35. This example is based on Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309
(K.B.).
36. This example is based on Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 118 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App. 2003).
37. The reader may not be convinced that these are instances properly fitting
the genus “opportunism.” Three replies are offered. The first may be unsatisfying:
to rigorously defend the proposition that lawful opportunism constitutes a wrong
requires another article (in process). Second, so long as the reader admits that
enforcement after calamity is sometimes (if not typically) opportunistic, this
Article endeavors to provide insight into that phenomenon. Finally, whether one
agrees that it is opportunistic or otherwise wrongful for a plaintiff to shift to one’s
counterparty all losses from the calamity to the extent legally permitted, it is
uncontroversial to observe that no one likes to be on the vulnerable side of that
equation. Worrying about potentially painful vulnerability in a transaction is a
real cost that reduces the transactions parties pursue at arms-length, and the
underlying phenomenon remains to be studied, as this Article does. Why does
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economic cost-benefit tipping point that makes legal
enforcement attractive next to relationship-preserving
alternatives in a specific context: contractual calamity
beyond the bounds of the bargain.38 In addition, the account
specifies the institutional fault line at the root of lawful
opportunism to be the willingness of courts to hear claims for
“the ‘lawful’ gains to be had by insistence upon literal
enforcement” where a highly consequential disturbance has
undercut the spirit of the deal that was bargained. 39
Beyond this economic and institutional analysis,
Williamson does not explore the individual characteristics
that tend to give rise to lawful opportunism, his focus being
the institutional (macro-level) implications for governance.40
If the willingness to act with guile stokes blatant forms of
opportunism (like Wells Fargo’s swindling), what
characteristic animates lawful opportunism? Absent a microlevel conceptualization (like the character of guile provides
blatant opportunism), organizational theorists and
behavioral legal scholars have little foothold to break ground
with empirical research that elucidates when and why
parties experience lawful opportunism and, consequently,
how to forestall its costs.41
To fill this conceptual gap, this Article develops and
extends Williamson’s diagnosis that literal enforcement
provokes the institutional fault line that foments lawful
opportunism in Part I.42 This Article’s further contribution

contract law make parties so vulnerable after calamity? What drives parties to
take advantage of this vulnerability?
38. Williamson, supra note 7, at 272–73.
39. Id. at 273.
40. See generally id. at 269–96.
41. For an example of the theoretical utility of guile for organizational theory,
see Keith G. Provan & Steven J. Skinner, Interorganizational Dependence and
Control as Predictors of Opportunism in Dealer-Supplier Relations, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 202 (1989) (relying on Williamson’s definition of “self-interest seeking
with guile” as basis for theorizing empirical study of blatant opportunism).
42. Williamson focuses on hybrid governance carried out through what he
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in Part II is to build upon the analysis set forth in Part I with
an empirical study designed to examine factors that predict
variance in the propensity to press one’s legal entitlements
in conditions ripe for lawful opportunism. Participants were
presented with a vignette that put them in the position of a
contracting party who has to respond to a highly
consequential disturbance that made the counterparty’s
performance as per the terms of the agreement impossible.
Participants then selected among a range of options that
were alternatively cooperative (hence tending to preserve the
relationship), blatantly opportunistic (i.e., actions to
appropriate value guilefully), or lawfully opportunistic in
character (i.e., actions to appropriate value by enforcing, or
threatening to enforce, legal entitlements). The findings
concerning the propensity of participants to select lawfully
opportunistic responses reinforce the conceptual conclusion
that entitlement is to lawful opportunism as guile is to the
blatant opportunism so well understood by scholars.
Why does all this matter for public policy and law? The
fear of becoming victim to lawful opportunism—for
entrepreneurs, for managers of business organizations, and
for citizens at large—presents a transaction cost43 that
dampens the potential for arms-length contracting to serve
as a vehicle for ingenuity and productivity. Responding to
this challenge and potential, the overarching aim of this
Article is to promote the mitigation of the transaction costs
of lawful opportunism through theoretical and empirical
extensions of Williamson’s sparse sketch of the concept.
labels neoclassical contracting devices, such as co-governance through
committees and reliance upon arbitration. Williamson, supra note 7, at 271–73.
However, the doctrinal foundations of neoclassical contracting that give rise to
lawful opportunism also underpin one-shot deals that are negotiated off the
market by the parties. These transactions are especially “hazardous,”
Williamson, supra note 10, at 250, precisely for want of the co-governance devices
that define joint ventures and alliances and the standardization of terms
achieved by thick markets. Moreover, for the same reasons, litigation over excuse
doctrine tends to result from one-shot deals like the cases featured in this Article
as Anecdotes 2–5. See supra notes 12, 34–36 and accompanying text.
43. Williamson, supra note 7, at 269.
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The discussion of results is presented in Part III, and
Part IV concludes.
I. CALAMITY, NAÏVETÉ, AND ENOUGH ENTITLEMENT
YIELD LAWFUL OPPORTUNISM
Until there is an exchange of consideration between
parties, there is no contract to anchor lawfully opportunistic
enforcement. Section A begins, therefore, from the
bargaining and exchange that give birth to the negotiated
contracts of hybrid governance,44 and then zeroes in on the
naïveté that so often limits the bounds of bargaining and
exchange to the “fair-weather” case—without giving a
thought to the complications of pricing and risk that highly
consequential disturbances tend to force upon deals. 45
44. In Discrete Structural Alternatives, Williamson devotes the discussion of
hybrid governance to the case of long-term contracts that include “neoclassical”
contracting devices, such as committees and recourse to arbitration. Id. at 271–
73. In an early work before introducing the mode of hybrid governance,
Williamson acknowledges the category of transactions that are hybrid insomuch
as they are “nonstandardized” by thick markets but are nevertheless carried out
through one-shot deals in the form of “market governance,” describing them as
“hazardous.” Williamson, supra note 10, at 250. His study of transaction cost
economics does not feature nonstandardized transactions that must be concocted
by the parties in one-shot deals that have no off-the-rack market. Nevertheless,
in Discrete Structural Alternatives, Williamson identifies excuse doctrine as a
check on literal enforcement. Williamson, supra note 7, at 271. The leading cases
of excuse are illustrative of the hazards of nonstandardized one-shot deals. See
Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.) (four-performance deal); Krell
v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (one-day flat rental to view royal procession). This
Article’s focus is on the hazard of lawful opportunism, as theorized by Williamson
and as it afflicts nonstandardized one-shot deals.
45. Or one or both of the parties might think of a risk and yet leave the deal
terms unaffected. See, e.g., Krell, 2 K.B. at 755 (Romer, L.J.) (expressing “[t]he
doubt . . . whether the parties to the contract now before us could be said, under
the circumstances, not to have had at all in their contemplation the risk that for
some reason or other the coronation processions might not take place on the days
fixed”); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2003) (explaining why “parties write deliberately
incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefiniteness doctrine” partly
based on variance between “a significant fraction of individuals [who] behave as
if reciprocity were an important motivation (even in isolated interactions with
strangers), [and] a comparable fraction [who] react as if motivated entirely by
self-interest”).
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Section B introduces the specter of highly consequential
disturbances that expose the naïveté of the parties. Section
C examines how literal enforcement comes to spawn lawful
opportunism. Section D arrives at the conclusion that the
human linchpin of the phenomenon—and the immediate
source of the troublesome transaction costs—is the
complaining party’s strong enough sense of entitlement to so
lean on the legal entitlement to claim damages.
A. Bargains, Commitment, and Consideration
To Karl Llewellyn, principal drafter of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the bargaining that gives rise to contracts
is the heart of what distinguishes the prevailing liberal
economic system from those organized by tradition (e.g.,
feudalism, castes) or fiat (e.g., totalitarianism). 46 A bargain
requires a set of agreeable terms concerning the parties’
present and future commitments to each other.47 However,
no matter how much the parties think them through and
work them out, deal terms do not provide the will to get a
deal off the ground. What turns an agreement, as a set of

46. “Bargain is then the social and legal machinery appropriate to arranging
affairs in any specialized economy which relies on exchange rather than tradition
(the manor) or authority (the army, the U. S. S. R.) for apportionment of
productive energy and of product.” Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 717 (1931); see also Morris R. Cohen, The
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 553 (1932) (noting that the “dictum that
the progress of the law has been from status to contract . . . . has generally been
understood as stating not only a historical generalization but also a judgment of
sound policy—that a legal system wherein rights and duties are determined by
the agreement of the parties is preferable to a system wherein they are
determined by ‘status’”).
47. An exchange that occurs entirely in the present would be “better described
as a barter or an exchange of goods” because it “creates no contractual duty.”
Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 171–72 (1917). This bringing of the future into the
present is called “presentiation” by Ian Macneil. Ian R. Macneil, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 589 (1974)
(“Presentiation is thus a recognition that the course of the future is bound by
present events, and that by those events the future has for many purposes been
brought effectively into the present.”).
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agreeable terms, into a living deal that inspires each side to
invest time, money, or energy is enough commitment from
all parties concerned to execute the exchange.48
There are numerous sources of commitment that parties
might draw upon to unlock their mutual willingness to
consummate the bargain—from secured collateral to down
payments to reputation. 49 How much commitment is
required of each party depends on many factors, including
the stakes of the deal,50 the relationship between the
parties,51 and the availability of other disciplining feedback,
such as reputation in a shared community. 52 Nevertheless,
as the formal gatekeeper to enforceability in the common
law, the doctrine of consideration does not require courts to
assess any reasonable proportionality in the commitments
entailed by, and exchanged through, contract.53 Rather, the

48. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520–22 (1983) (expressing skepticism
about the sufficiency and robustness of the commitment undergirded by contract
law and discussing the important role of hostages in backing credible
commitments).
49. In commercial transactions, collateral is often secured, in part, through
contracts. Historically, humans were not infrequently delivered as hostages to
back commitments. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., references this practice in
recounting that “the surety of ancient law was the hostage, and the giving of
hostages was by no means confined to international dealings.” OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 248 (1881). The human hostage as a contractual
security seems to be uncommon today, certainly outside the realm of organized
crime and terrorism. Still, the use of hostages is prevalent and typically takes the
form of forfeit or property as collateral. See Williamson, supra note 48, at 522.
50. See Williamson, supra note 48, at 522 (addressing the demands for
commitment presented by “[c]osts that are highly specific to a transaction”).
51. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 483, 485 (recognizing “that discrete exchange [without
relationship] . . . can play only a very limited and specialized function in any
economy”).
52. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 157
(1992) (providing “explanations of why the diamond industry has long relied on
the extralegal enforcement of its business norms”).
53. “[S]o long as the requirement of a bargained-for benefit or detriment is
satisfied, the fact that the relative value or worth of the exchange is unequal is
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threshold inquiry to establish contract formation looks to the
mutual exchange of commitment, as of a moment in time.54
The willingness of common law courts to enforce
contracts—with nothing more than evidence of exchange55—
lubricates the economy with commitment “when
reputational or self-enforcement sanctions will not avail.” 56
The enforceability of contracts thus works a feat of alchemy:
A deal that might have started with no collateral at all
(beyond each party’s words) yields, in its breakdown, a
judgment that may be backed by the state.57 Contracts are,
therefore, attractive—if not unavoidable58—sources of
commitment in arms-length contracting, as they empower

irrelevant so that anything which fulfills the requirement of consideration will
support a promise, regardless of the comparative value of the consideration and
of the thing promised. The rule is almost as old as the doctrine of consideration
itself.” 3 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:21 (4th ed. 2018)
(footnotes omitted).
54. “[C]lassical contract law draws clear lines between being in and not being
in a transaction; e.g., rigorous and precise rules of offer and acceptance prevail
with no half-way houses where only some contract interests are protected or
where losses are shared.” Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 864 (1978).
55. According to Professor Corbin, “[t]here seems to be no serious doubt that
a mutual agreement to trade a horse for a cow would be an enforceable contract,
even though it is made by two ignorant persons who never heard of a legal
relation and who do not know that society offers any kind of a remedy for the
enforcement of such an agreement.” 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 34, at 135 (1st ed. 1950) (as quoted by Gregory Klass, Three Pictures
of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1754
(2008)).
56. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 562 (2003).
57. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 662 (2012) (“[T]here [is] not one, but two ‘promises’ [that
give rise to contract]: the promise to perform, and the promise to be bound by the
default rules supplied by the law of contract.”).
58. Contracts are unavoidable in the sense that no formality, or even an
exchange of words, is required beyond the fact of exchange. See CORBIN, supra
note 55. But see Barnett, supra note 57, at 652 (proposing that “the presence of a
bargain in the commercial context could be negated by evidence that the parties
did not intend to be legally bound”).
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parties with a legitimate process for making state-backed
demands upon a counterparty who has allegedly breached.
B. Naiveté, Calamity, and the Speechless Deal
One of the cardinal rules of contract law is that “[c]ourts
cannot make agreements for persons who are competent to
make them for themselves.”59 Because competence means
legal competence—rather than some requirement of
professional competence to incur obligations—courts enforce
contracts without differentiating between doctrine governing
agreements drawn up by parties who are savvy in their
planning for potential disruption, and naïve parties who are
not. If performance never gets complicated by contingency,
then naïveté in the bargain remains immaterial as the
parties at the time of performance will be bolstered by
economic terms that hew with their bargain.
Sometimes, though, naïveté in the bargain comes back to
haunt the parties.60 Consider the leading case of Taylor v.
Caldwell—the inspiration behind Anecdote 4 and the
empirical study reported in Part II. Taylor and Lewis agreed
with Caldwell and Bishop that the latter two would provide
the Surrey Gardens and Music Hall for four performance
days over the summer, at a per diem rate, with sundry
entertainments included in the fee.61 There is no evidence
59. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co. v. Evans, 55 A. 373, 376 (Md. 1903). The court
adds, “when attempts to enter into obligations fail because of the obscurity of the
terms employed it is far better that the parties be left where they have placed
themselves than for the judicial tribunals by forced interpretations to construct
agreements for them.” Id.; see also Arthur L. Corbin, Book, The Effect of War on
Contracts, 55 YALE L.J. 848, 849 (1946) (book review).
60. Whereas the naïve bargain may yield a contract that is “obligationally”
complete (assuming literal enforcement), economists would call it “insufficiently
state contingent.” See Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585, 585–589 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).
61. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 310 (K.B.). The agreement
spells out in impressive detail the array of entertainments that Caldwell and
Bishop committed to provide. For example, along with “an efficient and organised
military and quadrille band,” there would also be “fireworks and full
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whatsoever that the parties had a shared understanding
about what should happen in case the Music Hall and
grounds could not be made available, as in the case of the fire
that occurred in June before the first show.62 What deal had
the parties made? Was each side to suffer its own expenses
at the time of the fire, was the deal something else, or was
there no deal at all on the question?63 According to Justice
Blackburn in the lead opinion, “[t]he parties when framing
their agreement evidently had not present to their minds the
possibility of such a disaster.”64
How could these parties fail to strike a deal covering the
risk of fire? Humans are optimistic,65 talk of risks quells the
excitement of bargains, and parties who do not know any
better are wont to get carried away by the fair-weather case
apparently in view.66 When this happens, the bargained deal
is bounded in its scope by fair-weather conditions insomuch
as the parties did not price and allocate risks otherwise. In
Taylor v. Caldwell, the parties’ naïveté was failing to plan for
the possibility that the Music Hall might not be available as
promised. Perhaps the most compelling evidence that the
parties failed to consider this contingency is that they were

illuminations; a ballet or divertissement, if permitted; a wizard and Grecian
statues; tight rope performances; rifle galleries; air gun shooting; Chinese and
Parisian games; [and] boats on the lake.” Id. at 311.
62. Id. at 311–12.
63. Cf. Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of
Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1991). (“Our hypothesis is that the
characteristic and traditional response of our legal system to cases of mistaken
and frustrated contracts is neither to relieve the disadvantaged party nor to
assign the loss to the superior risk bearer, but to leave things alone.”).
64. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312.
65. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199, 204 (2006) (discussing the “[o]ptimism bias[, which] refers to
the tendency of people to believe that their own probability of facing a bad
outcome is lower than it actually is”).
66. Cf. Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
277, 278 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“Incomplete contracts sometimes will not
condition on payoff-relevant information—here the nature and probabilities of
future states of the world—even when both parties know it.”).
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savvy about, and expressly attended to, other contingencies
of comparatively trivial import: the commitment to provide
“aquatic sports” at the Gardens was “weather permitting,”
and the presentation of “ballet or divertissement” depended
on obtaining the requisite permits.67
We know that as of closing (i.e., offer and acceptance), 68
the Taylor v. Caldwell parties had contemplated a number of
details, including the precise number of players required in
musical bands (35 to 40) and how many wizards would
entertain (1), because they provided for a relevant
commitment in the agreement.69 However, the agreement
does not evidence that they gave any attention to terms for
fire. Therefore, the court’s conclusion seems the only
reasonable assumption: the risk of fire was not priced into
the deal, because the parties apparently never bargained to
allocate the resulting risks.70 The problem is not that they
once knew the answer but forgot to write it down.71 The
problem is that they were naïve about the risk of fire that
materialized, and the complexities of that class of
contingencies did not figure into the deal at all. 72 When the

67. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 311.
68. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
69. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 311.
70. Id. at 312.
71. See Derek J. Harmon et al., Breaking the Letter vs. Spirit of the Law: How
the Interpretation of Contract Violations Affects Trust and the Management of
Relationships, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 497, 498 (2015) (defining “spirit [of the
contract] violations as the failure to fulfill an undocumented, yet still presumably
tacitly agreed upon, expectation”).
72. Parties are not prescient but rather limited by bounded rationality,
WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 21–23, and yet the fault lines of the deal are known
in advance. In a supply agreement, where one party pays the other for a good or
service, the seller may be unable to perform, tracking impossibility doctrine, see
Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312, or may lose reason to perform due to commercial
impracticability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST.
1981), and the buyer may lose reason to buy due to frustration of purpose, see
Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 740. There is also the possibility that the buyer
is unable to pay when due, and this also represents an important fault line that
complicates contracting. In legal terms, however, this last case presents no
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parties most needed clarity, the deal was rendered
speechless to say anything of substance.
The naïveté that left the Taylor v. Caldwell deal so
vulnerable to fire presupposed no guile at all. Honesty and
candor at the bargaining stage will not immunize a contract
from this vulnerability. The objective of the next Section
(Section C) is to demonstrate how literal enforcement
converts this vulnerability into contractual cracks liable to
host lawful opportunism.
C. Literal Enforcement Hardens Naïveté into Cracks
Justice Blackburn, in the leading opinion for the Queen’s
Bench in Taylor v. Caldwell, begins his legal analysis with
the assessment, already previewed, that “[t]he parties when
framing their agreement evidently had not present to their
minds the possibility of such a disaster [as the burning down
of the Music Hall], and have made no express stipulation
with reference to it.”73 Given their naïveté towards fire risk,
what the Taylor v. Caldwell parties owe each other after the
fire is a question beyond the bounds of the actual bargain
they expressed. The motive of the litigation was precisely
that “the answer to the question must depend upon the
general rules of law applicable to such a contract.”74
The first general rule of law that Justice Blackburn
formulates is the doctrine of literal enforcement
undergirding Williamson’s characterization of lawful
opportunism: “There seems no doubt that where there is a
doctrinal or conceptual difficulties: If performance was tendered, the buyer’s
payment obligation survives non-payment, and if the buyer repudiates for
inability to pay before performance is tendered, the seller’s obligation is
discharged under the doctrine of bilateral contracts. See Keith A. Rowley, A Brief
History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV.
565, 609 (2001) (noting that “[t]he [first] Restatement provided that a promisor
[who] committed an anticipatory breach of a bilateral contract, excus[ed] the
promisee from performing any condition precedent or any return promise”
(footnote omitted)).
73. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312.
74. Id.
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positive contract to do a thing, not in itself unlawful, the
contractor must perform it or pay damages for not doing it,
although in consequence of unforeseen accidents, the
performance of his contract has become unexpectedly
burthensome or even impossible.”75 The doctrine of literal
enforcement, in the stringent form here articulated, says
that in the first instance courts do not condition performance
on account of “unforeseen accidents” that render
performance “unexpectedly burthensome,” unless the
accident was somehow expressly accounted for. This
expresses the default rule in the common law that “promises
must be kept though the heavens fall.”76 The “de rigeur
citation” for this proposition is the 1647 case, Paradine v.
Jane (Anecdote 3),77 in which the court required the
defendant-tenant, forcibly expropriated from years of
tenancy by civil war, to pay damages for back rent.78 The
cited holding is that “when the party by his own contract
creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make
it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by
inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against
it by his contract.”79
75. Id.
76. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 13.1,
at 495 (4th ed. 1998); see also 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1 (1963) (observing “the long tradition that ‘justice’ is absolute”).
77. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust LongTerm Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 n.4 (1985); see also Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1535 & n.36 (2016) (attributing to Paradine v. Jane the rule
that “the risks associated with performance of an obligation assumed by contract
are assigned by default to the promisor”); Execution of a Contract Impossible, 10
AM. JUR. 250, 251–52 (1833) (same).
78. Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897–98 (K.B.).
79. Id. at 897; see also FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS,
CASES AND MATERIALS 758 (2d ed. 1970) (observing that Paradine v. Jane is
typically cited as the “leading case for the proposition” that the law traditionally
did not recognize an impossibility excuse). But see id. (“Paradine v. Jane does not
appear to have been a particularly famous case in its day or for a hundred and
fifty years thereafter.”). As soon as it joined the canon in the 19 th century,
Paradine v. Jane was criticized in the American Jurist: “I do not hesitate to say
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When calamity strikes a contract in naïveté’s blind spot
(e.g., the Music Hall fire),80 literal enforcement turns the
boundedness of the deal into a sharp “crack” in the contract.
This crack invites a breach claim based on appeal to the
premise of literal enforcement. The metaphor of the crack
alludes to the wedge that calamity drives between the
economic expectations embedded in the naïve deal that was
bargained and the economic implications of a breach claim
based on literal enforcement of the contract post-disruption.
The hope that energized the original deal is now bygone, and
yet the colorable breach of contract claim provides the party
disappointed by non-performance a vehicle to offset the costs
of calamity. According to Williamson, “[t]he general
proposition here is that when the ‘lawful’ gains to be had by
insistence upon literal enforcement exceed the discounted
value of continuing the exchange relationship, defection from
the spirit of the contract can be anticipated.”81 The empirical
question this Article sets out to elucidate is what else, other
than the raw economic incentive to do so, drives contracting
parties to choose a lawfully opportunistic response to
calamity. What remains, therefore, is to characterize the
trait that activates lawful opportunism the way guile
activates blatant forms of opportunism.82
D. The Sense of Entitlement Behind Lawful Opportunism
The legal entitlement of the potential plaintiff to push
that the doctrine that it lays down is in direct opposition to common sense and
common justice.” Execution of a Contract Impossible, supra note 77, at 251.
80. The contract would be vulnerable even without literal enforcement
because there is an actual crisis to respond to that puts new demands on the
parties and their relationship.
81. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273.
82. Arguably, the idea of guile is inherent in the forms of blatant opportunism
(i.e., What is lying or stealing without guile?) so that the idea that guile gives rise
to blatant opportunism may be better interpreted as conclusory rather than
causal. Just the same, the concept of lawful opportunism as introduced by
Williamson remains so inchoate that the character trait in which it inheres
remains to be named and elucidated.
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for the hard bargain in a lawfully opportunistic way lies
dormant until activated. Whereas blatant forms of
opportunism require guile for the agent to surreptitiously get
away with the benefits of, say, stealing, the visibility of the
activities involved in lawful opportunism requires the agent
to openly embrace the stratagem adopted. The analytical
approach in this section will be to probe the negative
repercussions of lawful opportunism in light of its necessary
transparency and openness.
Williamson’s transaction cost concern for hybrid
governance is focused on those cases where “strict
enforcement would have truly punitive consequences, . . .
especially if the resulting ‘injustice’ is supported by (lawful)
opportunism.”83 The punishing form of justice that is the
hallmark of literal enforcement has been noted by
commentators for centuries.84 An early student note in the
Harvard Law Review succinctly summarizes this Part and
why injustice results:
It is usually to the interest of both parties that a contract be carried
out. Where performance is prevented by an event, against the
occurrence of which neither can reasonably be held to have
warranted, both suffer a loss for which neither is responsible. In
such circumstances it seems highly unjust to throw all the loss on
the one whose performance may happen to have been interfered
with.85

Scholars continue to debate how best to handle these
cases given that literal enforcement is a blunt instrument

83. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273 (stating, “the state realization in
question was unforeseen and unforeseeable (different in degree and/or especially
in kind from the range of normal business experience)[, even] if strict
enforcement would have truly punitive consequences”).
84. Execution of a Contract Impossible, supra note 77, at 251; see also Maxine
MacKay, The Merchant of Venice: A Reflection of the Early Conflict between
Courts of Law and Courts of Equity, 15 SHAKESPEARE Q. 371, 373 (1964)
(discussing Portia’s plea that mercy is mightier than the literal enforcement of
the contract that would exact a pound of flesh).
85. Note, Impossibility of Performing Contracts as a Defense, 15 HARV. L. REV.
63, 64 (1901).
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when calamity strikes at the naïveté of a contract.86 As the
law stands, the potential for literal enforcement represents
an invitation to press legal entitlements, where accepting the
invitation requires one to overlook or otherwise accede to the
relationship-destroying injustice that may result from
enforcing the crack in the contract for one’s cash interest or
the disciplining leverage thereby derived.
The human tendency to overlook the potential injustice
that results from claiming legal entitlements was identified
by Aristotle as the vice that the virtue of epieikeia, or
decency, corrects or avoids.87 The discussion of epieikeia in
the Nicomachean Ethics comes as Aristotle confronts the
implications of the inherent limitations in legislated law
that, though bound to fail in its application to specific cases,
nevertheless gets interpreted to reach all cases that fit the
text.88 To display the virtue of decency is to rely on
discernment to “to rectify the deficiency” that is inevitable in
the application of legislation to facts.89 Aristotle’s
86. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and
Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207 (2009) (proposing various tests for
providing relief in cases of unexpected occurrences); Victor P. Goldberg, Excuse
Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 359 (2010)
(criticizing Eisenberg’s 2009 article); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility,
Impracticability, and Frustration—Professor Goldberg Constructs an Imaginary
Article, Attributes it to Me, and then Criticizes It, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 383 (2010)
(responding to Goldberg’s criticism).
87. In Aristotle’s framework, virtues represent the “golden mean” between too
little and too much of some character trait. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 44–
45 (trans. Terence Irwin) (1985). The courageous person, for example, strikes at
the balance between cowardliness and brashness. Id. at 49. In his discussion of
decency, reviewed infra, Aristotle only discusses the “stickler” who has too much
entitlement. The other vice, not mentioned, would display too little sense of
entitlement, i.e., being a pushover who lets others override their entitlements
willy nilly.
88. ARISTOTLE, supra note 87, at 144 (reasoning that “all law is universal, but
in some areas no universal rule can be correct; and so where a universal rule has
to be made, but cannot be correct, the law chooses the [universal rule] that is
usually [correct], well aware of the error being made” (alterations in original)).
Aristotle emphasizes that “the source of the error is not the law or the legislator,
but the nature of the object itself.” Id.
89. Id. at 145.
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characterization of the way the decent person acts and, more
specifically, does not act provides the missing insight to
complete the basic account of lawful opportunism. The
decent person is “not an exact stickler for law in the bad
way,”90 whereas Williamson’s lawful opportunist is indeed a
stickler for the letter of the contract in a potentially
punishing way.91 How does decency rectify the (legislated or
contractual) law? Aristotle’s answer is that the decent person
“tak[es] less than he might even though he has the law on
his side.”92
What decency regulates is precisely the agent’s sense of
entitlement to claim legal entitlements. To choose lawfully
opportunistic enforcement of the breach of contract claim,
one’s sense of entitlement must be strong enough, or blind
enough, under the circumstances to overshadow the
potentially punishing consequences of literal enforcement.
The conceptual significance of this conclusion becomes
salient in juxtaposition with blatant opportunism. The
blatant opportunist may desire the spoils of fraud or deceit
without necessarily embodying a robust enough sense of
entitlement to claim like value openly. Conversely, the
lawful opportunist may flinch at the prospect of bending or
breaking rules guilefully. Hence, while both strategies may
serve to appropriate value, each taps into, and arises from,
distinctive character traits.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY
This Article’s research motivation is not only to better
understand lawful opportunism as a concept, but also to
begin to make sense of lawful opportunism as an empirical

90. Id.
91. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273.
92. ARISTOTLE, supra note 87, at 145. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
does not address the question of whether decency is ever consistent with taking
more than one’s legal entitlements, as suggested by cases of justifiable civil
disobedience.
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phenomenon. Supposing literal enforcement (with or without
excuse doctrine93), what are the sources of variance in the
likelihood that a contract will break apart due to lawfully
opportunistic contracting behaviors?
To break ground on this question, we pursued an
empirical study designed to explore the individual-level
factors that motivate participants to access lawful
opportunism as a contracting behavior distinct from
behaviors that are cooperative or blatantly opportunistic.
While actual contracts and contracting contexts would
provide an ideal setting for the study of these phenomena in
terms of ecological validity, natural and field experiments
are problematic for research into a novel construct given the
lack of control over extraneous variables. We therefore test
the theoretical construct of lawful opportunism through a
contracting experimental survey.
In designing this study, this Article draws insights and
methodological precedents from recent scholarship in
organization theory that examine contracting parties’
contingent dispositions toward deals and their propensity to
engage in blatantly opportunistic violations of trust.94 These
studies point to the relevance of three relational dispositions
that are especially plausible moderators of an agent’s
willingness to abandon the contracting relationship for the
monetization of the breach of contract claim. These relational
93. This Article has sought to make clear that the risk of lawful opportunism
is not obviated by the possibility of excuse. Excuse mitigates the degree of
punishment caused by lawful opportunism—instead of paying for litigation
defense and damages, only paying for litigation defense. Moreover, the case
behind Anecdote 5 is a reminder that excuse is a fickle doctrine, not to be counted
on, even after a favorable verdict. See Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App. 2003) (reversing a verdict of
commercial impracticability at the trial court finding no evidence that the
buyer—and not only the seller—understood at the time of exchange that the
environmental credits the seller was committing to sell were the credits owned
by the buyer that the state department of environmental protection cancelled
unexpectedly before delivery).
94. See, e.g., Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21, at 559, 561–62; Malhotra &
Murnighan, supra note 21, at 534, 553, 557.
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dispositions are the agent’s (1) sense of entitlement (as
indicated by Part I’s analysis) and the agent’s sense of the
exchange as being predominantly either (2) economic or (3)
relational.95 The latter two may influence perceptions of the
trade-off involved in either cooperating with the
counterparty or defecting from the deal for the lawful gains
available, and there is the further question of their influence
upon the predilection to choose the blatantly opportunistic
alternatives presented to participants in the study.
A. The Study
1. Subjects
Participants were 1,300 U.S. adults recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Respondents received $1.30 for
participating. Fifty-seven percent of the subjects were male
and the average age category was 25–34 years old with 35%
over 35 years old. The participants were randomly assigned
a contracting scenario, which varied based on the specificity
of the contracting statement and the type of disruption. See
Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the sample.
TABLE 1.

Descriptive Statistics of Sample.

Index Variable
Cooperate
1
Factor
Lawful Opp
2
Factor
With Guile
3
Factor
Intended
4
Honesty
5
6
7
8

Entitlement
Economic
Exchange
Relationship
Exchange
Trust
Disposition

mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6.1

1.3

1

9.0

3.1

0.07

3.5

2.8 -0.19* 0.37*

75.3

32.8 0.14* -0.13* -0.46*

4.0

0.9

0.08* 0.33* -0.03 0.10*

4.2

0.8

0.14* 0.05 -0.28* 0.25* 0.18*

3.3

1.0

0.17* -0.18* -0.23* 0.29* 0.06 0.11*

48

46.0 0.07* -0.07* -0.19* 0.30* 0.01 -0.02 0.27* 1

1
1
1
1
1
1

95. See Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21 at 566 (discussing how parties may
view exchange partners in “instrumental (e.g., ‘money-making’)” or “relational”
terms).
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B. Methods
1. Design
To answer our research questions, we used controlled
contracting surveys with a variety of contracting scenarios
included as a vignette. Respondents were then asked the
likelihood they would take a series of actions.
2. Contracting Conditions
The base contracting scenario was seen by all
respondents, and is based on the case of Taylor v. Caldwell
(Anecdote 1), involving the renting of a theater for a
performance. The base scenario starts with a hypothetical
agreement. The respondents read the following:
You produce concerts through your business, and you focus on
festivals. For this year’s Memorial Day Festival, you have reserved a
venue close to the ocean. The Ocean View—an Inn with large
grounds—has offered its grounds in exchange for $6,000: $1,500 as
a deposit and $4,500 one month before the event.
With the venue secured, you then book the infrastructure needed—
security, portable toilets, food vendors, etc.—as well as booking the
acts and you begin to sell tickets.

This scenario is designed to create the potential for real
damages, specifically, the loss of deposits paid to
subcontractors and potential loss of revenue. In order to
capture intended contracting behavior over a range of
contracting contexts, we varied two aspects of the
contracting scenario in the survey: (1) whether there was a
clause in the contract that addresses the potential for
disruption and, if so, whether it addresses disruption in a
generic or a specific way; and (2) the type of disruption. The
respondents were assigned one of three possible conditions:
a generic condition that addresses the potential for
disruption generically, a null condition (with no qualifying
language in the agreement), and a specific condition that
addresses the potential for a specific kind of disruption. After
reading the scenario and then responding to a question about
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their intention to act honestly,96 one of two disruption
conditions is introduced to respondents—one concerning a
natural disaster (a hurricane) and one concerning a
regulatory change (environmental regulation)—both of
which would render the event impossible to host as agreed.
In both cases of disruption, the participant was told that an
alternative venue is available at an extra cost. See Appendix
B for specific clauses included.
3. Dependent Variables—Contracting Behavior
To capture the intention to act cooperatively, in a
lawfully opportunistic fashion, or in a blatantly opportunistic
fashion, the participants were asked to assess the likelihood
they would take different actions, having been confronted
with a highly consequential disturbance that prevented
performance as expected. The respondents were asked “How
likely would you take the following action?” and given a 6point scale of definitely, very probably, probably, possibly,
probably not, and definitely not. The options included actions
categorized as lawful opportunism (such as making demands
and threatening suit), blatant opportunism (such as shirking
and fraud), or cooperation (such as making requests and
problem solving). Four sub-types for each type of contracting
behavior were included, as shown in Table 2 below.

96. See id. (using a questionnaire to assess “willingness to behave
opportunistically, sense of entitlement, and level of aspiration”).
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Intended Actions.

Contracting
Behavior
Cooperative
Actions:
Fair play, honest
dealing, complying
with agreements,
commitment.97
Information
exchange and
coordination.98

Lawful
Opportunism:
Demands, Threat of
law suit, Law suit

Sub-type

Operationalized in Survey Options

Honest dealing

Call back the The Ocean View to find out what
the owner has in mind

Information
exchange

Suggest to the owner of The Ocean View that you
should discuss the consequences of the change in
circumstances to figure out the best way to share
the burdens

Coordination

Suggest to the owner of The Ocean View that you
should invite a third-party to help you figure out
how to deal with the burdens of the change in
circumstances

Request for
refund

Request that The Ocean View refund you the
$6,000 you paid in advance

Demand for

Demand that The Ocean View refund you the
$6,000 you paid in advance

refund
Demand to
cover increased
costs
Demand to
cover out of
pocket losses
Threat of law
suit for nonpayment of
demand

Demand that The Ocean View pay the additional
$2,000 you will have to pay the state college to
put on the festival at the stadium (the state
college charges $6,000 and the Inn charged only
$4,000)
Demand that The Ocean View compensate you
for the $1,000 you will lose from the portable
toilets
Be prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View
that if you do not get what you demand, you will
file a complaint [with the town to report a zoning
violation that you noticed the last time you were
at the property]99

97. See T.K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Between Trust and Control: Developing
Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 491, 492
(1998) (“[P]artner cooperation is characterized by honest dealing, commitment,
fair play, and complying with agreements.”).
98. See Malhotra & Lumineau, supra note 20, at 983–84 (discussing
information exchange and coordination provisions).
99. The bracketed language tracks the cheat act for blatant opportunism, but
this was an error in the instrument and represents a limitation in the exploratory
study. The kind of complaint that is consistent with the species of lawful
opportunism identified by Williamson is one alleging breach of contract. See
Williamson, supra, note 7, at 273.
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Blatant
Opportunism:
Lie, Cheat, Steal.
Calculated efforts to
mislead, distort,

Cheat

disguise, obfuscate,
or otherwise confuse
Threaten
to Libel
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Be prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View
that if you do not get what you demand, you will
report a zoning violation that you noticed the last
time you were at the property to the town. You
expect this could cost The Ocean View $5,000 or
more to address
Be prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View
that if you do not get what you demand, you will
ask your friend, who is a reporter with the local
newspaper, to write (undeservedly) negative
reviews about The Ocean View

Lie

Lie to The Ocean View’s owner and say that your
exposure to losses from the portable toilets is
actually $1,500 (and not $1,000) and that you
have to pay the state college an extra $3,000 (not
$2,000) so that if you have to negotiate at least
you start from a higher level

Steal

If The Ocean View does not give you what you
demand, you will compensate yourself by letting
yourself into the Inn and walking away with
several valuable paintings you noticed in the
hallways the last time you were there

4. Independent Variables
To capture the respondent’s perception of entitlement,
participants rated the degree to which they agreed with the
statement “I deserve a good deal in this agreement” using a
slider ranging from -100 to +100 (values were hidden).100 In
addition, to capture the participant’s perception of the nature
of the exchange, we asked participants to answer a series of
four questions using a 5-point Likert-type scale (ranging
from 1 = not at all, to 5 = extremely likely): To what extent do
you see your relationship with The Ocean View as
being . . . (1) an economic relationship . . . (2) as about
money . . . (3) as being about trust . . . (4) as being about
working well together. Two exchange constructs were created
with an economic exchange as the combination of (1) and (2)
100. See Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21, at 567; Emily M. Zitek, et al., Victim
Entitlement to Behave Selfishly, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245, 247–48
(2010).
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and a relationship exchange as the combination of (3) and
(4).101
5. Control Variables
After reading the scenario and being informed of the
disruption, the participants answered a series of questions
relating to their intention to act honestly and their trust
disposition. To capture the respondent’s intention to act
honestly, the participant rated the degree to which they
agreed with the following statement: How obligated do you
feel to act in a completely trustworthy and honest manner in
your dealings with The Ocean View?102 This question serves
to capture the presence of a propensity of the participant to
act in a blatantly opportunistic versus honest fashion. To
capture the respondent’s trust disposition, the participant
rated the degree to which they agree with the following
statement: In general, I give people the benefit of the doubt
until shown otherwise.
C. Results
1. Initial Analysis: Lawful Opportunism as a Distinct
Construct
Since lawful opportunism, as a contracting behavior, has
been theorized but not measured, we conducted an
exploratory factor analysis in order to identify the degree to
which the outcomes of lawful opportunism, blatant
opportunism, and cooperation are distinct factors.103
This analysis is exploratory: exploratory factor analysis
is designed to explore a data set and not to test hypotheses
or theories.104 Exploratory factor analysis is well suited to
101. See Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21, at 567.
102. Adopted from id. at 566.
103. See Chao C. Chen et al., Guanxi Practices and Trust in Management: A
Procedural Justice Perspective, 15 ORG. SCI. 200, 203–04 (2004) (use of
exploratory factor analysis to develop a theoretical construct).
104. Anna B. Costello & Jason Osborne, Best Practices in Exploratory Factor
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identify if outcomes are related but distinct, as the technique
is designed to explore untested concepts.105 We used an
iterated principal axis factoring with a promax rotation so as
to allow for the possibility the factors could be correlated.106
In order to identify the appropriate number of factors to
retain, we followed the approach recommended by Costello
and Osborne,107 using the scree plot of the eigenvalues and
identifying the natural bend in the data where the curve
flattens. We used the number of data points above the break.
The results are in Table 3. We then examined the variable
loadings (Table 3) to identify the cleanest structure with
variable loadings above 0.30, few item cross-loadings, and
factors excluded if fewer than three variables.108
The promax rotation allows the factors to correlate and
does not impose orthogonal assumption on the data. 109 Table
3 shows one factor—the first outcome of cooperation (CO1) to
load on more than one factor—but in opposite directions.
Similarly, BO1 loads on both blatant opportunism (Factor 1)
Analysis: Four Recommendations for Getting the Most From Your Analysis, 10
PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RES. & EVALUATION, no. 7, July 2005, at 1, 8.
105. See, e.g., Bradley L. Kirkman & Debra L. Shapiro, The Impact of Cultural
Values on Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment in Self-Managing
Work Teams: The Mediating Role of Employee Resistance, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 557,
558, 561 (2001).
106. See Costello & Osborne, supra note 104, at 3 (classifying promax rotation
as an “oblique” method and arguing that “oblique rotation should theoretically
render a more accurate, and perhaps more reproducible, solution” because it
“allow[s] the factors to correlate”).
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. One of the factors combines two acts that were distinguished only by
the substitution of the word “request” in the cooperative version and “demand” in
the lawfully opportunistic rendition: “[Request][Demand] that The Ocean View
refund you the $6,000 you paid in advance.” We observe that even the demandversion of the act is truly at, and arguably does not cross, the threshold of lawful
opportunism. The legal argument for this proposition would be that the demand
is for restitution (return of money) rather than contract performance. Lon L.
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,
46 YALE L.J 52, 54 (1936). For these reasons, the one factor with only two factors
is not a surprise.
109. See Costello & Osborne, supra note 104, at 3.
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as well as lawful opportunism (Factor 2).
TABLE 3.

Exploratory Factor Analysis Results—All Data
with only loadings > 0.3 shown.

Variable

With
Guile
Factor1

CO1

-0.3655

Pushing
Boundaries
Factor 2

Demand
Cooperate
Money
Factor 3
Factor 4
Uniqueness
0.3768

0.6521

CO2

0.7044

0.5111

CO3

0.3259

0.8596

CO4

0.8571

0.2543

LO1

0.9129

0.1875

LO2

0.8388

0.3279

LO3

0.6474

0.4812

LO4

0.8328

0.3195

0.3741

0.5321

BO1

0.4690

BO2

0.7623

BO3

0.6712

0.555

BO4

0.7103

0.4961

0.3979

The factors are then calculated for each respondent as
follows based on Table 3:
WithGuileFactor = -0.3655*CO1 + 0.469*BO1 + 0.7623*BO2 +
0.6712*BO3 + 0.7103*BO4
PushingBoundariesFactor = 0.8388*LO2 + 0.6474*LO3 +
0.8328*LO4 + 0.3741*BO1
CooperateFactor = 0.3768*CO1 + 0.7044*CO2 + 0.3259*CO3

While three separate outcome types were anticipated,
the analysis resulted in four factors encapsulating types of
contracting orientations. We also ran the exploratory factor
analysis separately by type of contract and disruption across
the surveys. The results, found in Appendix B, illustrate
equivalence in the number of factors as well as in the items
and weights included in each factor. In other words,
exploratory factor analysis was resilient across different
types of contracting scenarios and types of contracts.
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D. Individual Dispositions Impacting Intended Contracting
Behavior
We turn now to the primary empirical question: Who is
more likely to intend to act with lawful opportunism? To
answer our research question, the intended action scores
calculated above from the exploratory factor analysis were
broken into 25th percentile blocks, with “high” being in the
top 25% of each factor score. This allowed the analysis to
capture the likelihood of being in the top 25th percentile of
acting “with guile” (for example). A logistic analysis is
summarized in Table 4 for each intended action type (with
guile, pushing boundaries, and cooperation), where the
designation of “high” intended action is regressed onto the
independent and control variables. In order to conduct a
logistic regression, the independent variables were also
converted into flag for “high” scores (top 25%) for entitlement
as well as for the perception of being an economic or
relationship exchange.
The results show that respondents who view themselves
as more entitled (in top 25% of all respondents) are three
times more likely to act with lawful opportunism (p < 0.01).
Thus, we find that a contractor’s sense of entitlement impacts
their intention to act with lawful opportunism; respondents
with more entitlement are three times more likely to intend
to act with lawful opportunism.
We turn again to Table 4 to test the impact of a
contractor’s perception of the agreement in economic or
relationship terms. We evaluate the significance of (1) high
economic exchange on the propensity to act with lawful
opportunism, as well as the significance of (2) high relational
exchange on the propensity to act with lawful opportunism.
The results are presented in Table 4. Respondents who
perceive the exchange in economic terms are 64% more likely
to intend to act with lawful opportunism whereas
respondents who perceive the exchange in relationship terms
are 29% less likely to intend to act with lawful opportunism.
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In short, respondents’ perception of the exchange in
relational versus economic terms positively impacts the
intention to act with lawful opportunism whereas
respondents’ perception of the exchange in relational term
negatively impacts the intention to act with lawful
opportunism.
Table 4 also illustrates how blatant opportunism differs
from lawful opportunism in the individual traits that drive
intended behavior. For example, men are nearly 1.5 times
more likely to intend to act with guile (blatant opportunism);
younger respondents (less than 35 years old) are almost 2.3
times more likely to intend to act with guile. However, age
and gender are not significant factors for lawful
opportunism.
TABLE 4.

Likelihood of being in top quartile for each
action type.
Coefficient (SE)a
High With
High Pushing
High Cooperate
Guile Factor Boundaries Factor
Factor

High Entitled
High Economic
Exchange
High
Relationship
Exchange
High Intended
Honesty
High Trust
Disposition
Male
Age Over 35

0.92
(0.14)
0.46**
(0.07)

2.94**
(0.55)
1.64**
(0.22)

1.42*
(0.22)
1.18
(0.15)

0.54**

0.71*

1.90**

(0.09)

(0.10)

(0.25)

0.36**
(0.07)

1.05
(0.15)

1.23
(0.17)

0.55**
(0.10)
1.46*
(0.21)
0.44**
(0.07)
192.74
<0.001

1.01
(0.15)
1.17
(0.15)
1.03
(0.14)
64.18
<0.001

1.02
(0.15)
0.89
(0.11)
0.98
(0.13)
43.60
<0.001

Χ2
Prob > Χ2 b
aOutcome represents the result of the logistical analysis and is presented as
coefficient (SE); for all, N = 1,370; statistical significance is reported by the
presence of asterisks (*) where * indicates p < 0.05 and ** p < 0.01.
bProb > Χ2 represents the probability of obtaining the reported chi-square
statistic given that the null hypothesis is true (i.e. traditional “p-value” for
the model, establishing the effect of the independent variables, taken
together, on the dependent variable)

2019]

NOT GUILE BUT ENTITLEMENT

37

Further, respondents who view the exchange in more
economic terms (i.e., about money; an economic exchange)
are 40% less likely to act with guile. Put another way,
respondents who do not view the exchange in more economic
terms are two times more likely not to choose to act with
guile. Respondents who view the exchange as an economic
one are less likely to act with blatant opportunism, but more
likely to act with lawful opportunism.
In sum, the exploratory factor analysis we conducted
supports Williamson’s theoretical suggestion that lawful
opportunism represents a distinct construct to characterize
contracting behavior. This study illustrates how lawful
opportunism is distinct not only as evidenced by the
exploratory factor analysis, but also that it differs in the
behavioral profile of individual-level dispositions likely to
yield lawfully opportunistic rather than blatantly
opportunistic acts. More work should be done to understand
how and under what conditions lawful opportunism
manifests in contracting, and how it can be prevented.
TABLE 5.

Percent of Respondents in the HIGH Intended
Lawful Opportunism Factor.
High Lawful Opportunism
Entitlement
Low
Very High
Economic
Exchange

Hi

Low

Relationship
Exchange

Hi

Low

20%

48%

N = 284

N = 214

14%

43%

N = 660

N = 212

Low

Very High

12%

40%

N= 310

N= 168

17%

50%

N= 634

N= 258

38

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses for each
intended action and illustrates that blatant opportunism has
a high proportion of “definitely not” (black/dark gray),
whereas most of the cooperation actions have a high degree
of “definitely” and “probably” (light gray/white). The lawful
opportunism options are noticeably more attractive to
contractors than blatant opportunism, underscoring the
practical importance of understanding and overcoming this
transaction cost.
FIGURE 1.

Distribution of Responses for Each Intended
Action.a

Aggregated Data Across Surveys. Variables are abbreviated as follows: BO (blatant
opportunism), LO (Lawful opportunism), and CO (Cooperation).

a

III. DISCUSSION
This Article’s findings support Williamson’s specification
of lawful opportunism as a contracting behavior that is
distinct from the blatant and guileful forms of opportunism,
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and also from cooperative behaviors that are relationship
preserving. Crucially, the empirical study reinforces the
construct validity of entitlement as the wellspring of lawful
opportunism.110 This was the conclusion of the effort in Part
I to develop Williamson’s account to address the character
trait that unlocks this form of opportunism, the way guile
opens the door to blatant opportunism. Far and away, the
key factor that emerged as a predictor of an intention to act
with lawful opportunism, from among those studied, is a
strong sense of entitlement. Respondents who rated highest
(top quartile) for a strong sense of entitlement were three
times more likely than all other respondents to act with
lawful opportunism. What turns the cracks in contracts into
lawful opportunism is a strong enough sense of entitlement,
not only conceptually (as set forth in Part I), but also in our
study as a predictor of what makes one person more or less
likely to choose to so act.
In addition to the sense of entitlement and demographic
factors, we also studied the influence of the mindset that
participants brought to the deal vignette—categorized as
economic or relational. With respect to the influence on
lawful opportunism, the results support common sense: a
more economic mindset was more likely (by 64%) to choose
enforcement strategies in the aftermath of calamity, whereas
a more relational mindset was less likely (by 29%) to do so.
Less intuitive was the influence of the economic mindset on
blatant opportunism. Why were respondents who reported
an economic mindset so much less likely to act with blatant
opportunism? One possible explanation is that these
respondents’ increased attraction to lawful opportunism
crowded out and displaced the blatantly opportunistic
alternatives for capturing value post-calamity. What did
increase the likelihood of intending to act with guile (blatant
110. See Melenie J. Lankau & Terri A. Scandura, An Investigation of Personal
Learning in Mentoring Relationships: Content, Antecedents, and Consequences,
45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 779, 783 (2002) (“Results of the . . . exploratory factor analysis
pilot study provide preliminary construct validity evidence.”).
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opportunism) were demographic factors, specifically age and
gender. Men were approximately 1.5 times more likely to
intend to act with guile (blatant opportunism), and younger
respondents (less than 35 years old) were approximately 2.3
times more likely to intend to act with guile. However, age
and gender were not significant factors for lawful
opportunism.
A. Limitations
We have stressed that the empirical analysis reported in
this Article is exploratory in nature. Further study is
required to confirm the robustness of the tripartite
conceptualization of contracting strategies (blatant
opportunism, lawful opportunism, and cooperation) as
distinctive categories of intended behaviors.111 Analytically,
these categories are distinct for the reasons set forth in the
Introduction and Part I. However, in the world of
contracting, do parties decide how to confront calamity based
on a predisposition towards one strategy (e.g., tends to act
guilefully, rather than publicly and lawfully expressing their
strong sense of entitlement), or by considering the array of
discrete options, as listed in Table 3, and ranking them
according to relevant metrics (e.g., out-of-pocket and
opportunity costs, or reputation effects)?112 Put differently,
how and in what ways are our study’s findings sensitive to
the specific array of intended actions presented to
participants? Regardless, this analysis suggests the
importance of imagination113 and open-mindedness in
111. See supra note 99 (addressing a limitation with the instrument).
112. See supra Table 2 (detailing intended actions presented to respondents).
For example, “Demand that The Ocean View pay the additional $2,000 you will
have to pay the state college to put on the festival at the stadium” versus “Be
prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View that if you do not get what you
demand, you will ask your friend, who is a reporter with the local newspaper, to
write (undeservedly) negative reviews about The Ocean View.”
113. See Patricia H. Werhane, Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethical
Decision-Making in Management, BUS. ETHICS Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 75, 76 (1998)
(arguing that unethical actors in business need “moral imagination . . . . [because
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casting for a broad net of potential next steps as an antidote
to lawful opportunism. Indeed, one way to think about a high
tendency to act in a lawfully opportunistic way is fixation on
one’s sense of entitlement towards the expected value of the
contract to the exclusion of other ways out of the mess:
blinkered blindness does the work.114
In addition, the measurement of cooperation, lawful
opportunism, and blatant opportunism is driven by theory.
Further confirmatory analysis should be performed in
conjunction with the development of instruments to test for
different contracting contexts and outcomes.
B. Further Research
Our exploratory study discloses a number of important
directions for further empirical and conceptual inquiry. From
a behavioral and organizational perspective, a key set of
questions concerns the variety of antecedents that influence
a contractor’s sense of entitlement in a deal—at the moment
of choice. There are influences on two levels: (1) the
individual’s personal predispositions and (2) the history and
circumstances of the deal and relationship. How do these
factors interact to underpin choice? With respect to the
mindset of the participant towards the deal—economic or
relational—what determines whether a party relates to a
deal primarily on economic or relational terms? And with
respect to all these variables, to what extent do individuals
acting on behalf of organizations rely on their personal
predispositions and mindsets—for example, when they
receive a phone call from their counterparty’s agent relaying
the bad news about the disruption—and to what extent do
they channel an organizational ethos in those moments of
truth?
t]hey lack a sense of the variety of possibilities and moral consequences of their
decisions”).
114. Cf. id. at 79 (“Now and again, however, our perspectives become narrow,
microscopic or even fantasy driven, or a particular point of view becomes
ingrained so that one begins adopt only that perspective.”).
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The heartiest conceptual question set aside to
accomplish this Article’s objectives115 is explicating why
Williamson was right to lump lawful opportunism with
blatant opportunism as two species in the same genus. What
is actually wrong with pressing the legal entitlements that
one happens to have in contract?116 Put differently, can one
draw a clean line to separate warranted legal enforcement
(for example, suits against Wells Fargo by defrauded
customers (Anecdote 1)), from assertedly opportunistic forms
of enforcement (for example, Anecdotes 4 to 6)? So far as the
principles of governance are concerned,117 the matter is
semantic to the extent the transaction costs are real and
people get pushed away from deals they would otherwise
contemplate and pursue.118 Nevertheless, philosophically
speaking, is it fair to call this opportunism? If so, why?
A final set of critical questions concern prophylaxis—
both at the institutional and managerial levels. What can
courts (or legislatures) do to undercut the grip of lawful
opportunism? Williamson—and the contracts literature
115. See supra note 37.
116. For example, “contract is consent” theorist Randy Barnett might argue
that the parties’ economic bargain indicates that they intend to be legally bound
by the contract’s terms, however courts will enforce them, regardless the scope of
the bargain. See Barnett, supra note 57, at 655.
117. According to Williamson, “Lon Fuller’s definition of ‘eunomics’ as ‘the
science, theory or study of good order and workable arrangements’ is very much
in the spirit of what I refer to as governance.” Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting
Legal Realism: The Law, Economics, and Organization Perspective, 5 INDUS. AND
CORP. CHANGE 383, 397 (1996) (quoting Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy
at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin W. Patterson’s Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas
of the Law, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 477 (1953)). Fuller understood the insights of
eunomics to consist in those natural laws that constrain and guide the
mechanisms of what will actually work to realize ends given the way humans are
and how they interact institutionally. In this prism, the propensity to lawful
opportunism poses a limit to the promise of literal enforcement to serve as fitting
institutional means to economic ends. See Lon L. Fuller, American Legal
Philosophy at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin W. Patterson’s Jurisprudence,
Men and Ideas of the Law, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 447–78 (1953).
118. Compare with the unqualified interest in dissuading, for example, con
artists from entering into contracts by virtue of robust enforcement of breach of
contract claims.
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generally119—looks to the fine tuning of excuse doctrine—
more or less strict—though he sees no way around the
problem entirely.120 Another kind of solution that has been
suggested is to grant courts the authority to tailor the
outcome to the facts on behalf of the parties,121 with the
discretion of the chancellors to craft a fitting remedy. 122 If
radical alternatives are on the table,123 are there any other
doctrinal strategies available to address the problems
created by literal enforcement? Switching to the standpoint
of contracting parties—who must take the law as it is—are
there generic ways to insulate against the hazards of
naïveté?124 An exciting line of inquiry is to synthesize the
learning from the shared economy and the strategies and
algorithms employed for contracting and trust that diminish
the cracks for lawful opportunism to emerge in those
119. The literature is vast. E.g., Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility
Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1029 (1992); Joskow, supra note 17; Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Excuse Doctrine and
Retrospective Legislation: The Winstar Case, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 795.
120. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273.
121. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 670 (1997) (“‘[T]ailored’ default rules require lawmakers—
generally judges—to create default terms to govern a relationship between
contracting parties based on the specific characteristics and circumstances of
those parties.”).
122. Russell Fowler, A History of Chancery and Its Equity: From Medieval
England to Today’s Tennessee, TENN. B.J., Feb. 2012, at 20, 21 (“The chancellor
could also construct new remedies or ‘extraordinary’ solutions not offered by
inflexible law court procedures and writs.”).
123. For a contracts scholar dismissing views like Korobkin’s proposal, supra
note 121, see John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The
United States, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (1984) (urging that “judges . . . abstain from
rewriting the contracts of other people [because] they are not qualified for such
tasks”).
124. The contracts literature has pursued this question primarily from the
standpoint of the default rules that courts might introduce to substitute for
contracting that the parties did not do (generally under the rubric of
“majoritarian” default rules), or to induce contracting they should do (“penalty”
default rules). For discussion of the categories of default rules, see generally
Ayres, supra note 61.

44

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

spaces.125
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article was motivated by an inquiry into
Williamson’s provocative theorization of a form of
opportunism that is lawful rather than guileful. To
supplement Williamson’s account, Part I looked to the
agreement from Taylor v. Caldwell to trace the conditions
that convert a good faith bargain into a recipe for lawful
opportunism. The bargain must be naïve in a manner that
gets exposed by a highly consequential disturbance, and the
actor must feel entitled enough to press for performance,
notwithstanding the circumstances. The empirical study
confirms the salience of entitlement for lawful opportunism:
entitlement is to lawful opportunism what guile is to blatant
opportunism.
This research is intended to provide the foundation for
further study of lawful opportunism. The higher ambition is
to help pave the way for the design of interventions—at the
institutional (courts and law) and contractor levels—to help
dissolve the transaction costs of lawful opportunism to the
extent possible. In terms of the law and courts, the obvious
question is whether literal enforcement is a necessity or
could be avoided. In behavioral and organizational terms,
what makes principals and their agents feel entitled enough
to squeeze the cash value from cracks in contracts? What
techniques are available to contractors, at the front end—
and on an ongoing basis—to deflate an overly strong sense of
entitlement and motivate cooperation instead? These are
questions with significant legal, ethical, and economic
implications ripe for further behavioral and conceptual
study.
125. E.g., Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1067, 1071 (2015) (noting that “[s]haring platforms exercise control over
transactions by directing the form and content of listings, issuing minimum
quality standards for providers, providing an electronic payment system, and
charging a transaction fee for each exchange”).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1.
1

2

Survey Design

Question

Label

Values

Gender
What is your gender?

Male

1

Female

2

Under 18

1

18–24

2

25–34

3

35–44

4

45–54

5

55–64

6

65 +

7

Age
How old are you?

Intention to Act Opportunistically
Rating
How obligated do you feel to act in a
Null,
completely trustworthy and honest
manner in your dealings with Ocean

Contracting Scenario
3

Conditions:

Generic,

Specific

Not at all

⋮
Extremely

View?
Condition 1: Matched Disruption
OR

4

Entitlement (ENT)

Blatant Opportunity,
Lawful Opportunity,
5–16
or Cooperative Acts

Disagree
Condition 2: Unmatched Disruption
⋮
How much do you agree or disagree
Agree
with the following statement: I deserve
a good deal in this agreement
Read each option on its own and
Definitely
decide if it is a step you would be
⋮
likely to choose.
Definitely
Not
Please assess the likelihood you
would do the following:
e.g. Call back The Ocean View to
1
find out what the owner has in
mind

Relationship 1 (R1)
To what extent do you see your

17 relationship

with Alex as
being . . .
an
economic
relationship.

⋮
6

Not at all . . .
Slightly

1

Somewhat

⋮
5

Moderately
Completely

Relationship 2 (R2)
To what extent do you see your

18 relationship with Alex as
being . . . a relationship of
trust.

Not at all
⋮
Completely

1
⋮
5
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Relationship 3 (R3)

19

To what extent do you see your
relationship with Alex as
being . . . about money.
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Not at all
⋮
Completely

1
⋮
5

Not at all
⋮
Completely

1
⋮

Relationship 4 (R4)
To what extent do you see your
with Alex as
being . . . about working
well together.

20 relationship

Trust Disposition (TD)
21

In general, I give people the benefit
How much do you agree or of the doubt until shown otherwise
disagree with the following
statement:

5
-100
⋮

+100
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APPENDIX B
Table B1 shows the correlation of the intended action
with the grey boxes highlighting how each category of actions
is correlated with actions of the same type. Aside from CO3,
cooperative acts are correlated with each other as are blatant
opportunist actions. Further, cooperative actions are
negatively correlated with blatant opportunism—aside from
CO3 which is positively correlated.
Lawful opportunism has greater correlation with blatant
opportunism than with cooperation (e.g., LO2–4 are
positively correlated with BO1–3); lawful opportunistic acts
are correlated with other lawful opportunistic acts. The
results suggest lawful opportunism is viewed as a form of
opportunism and not as a form of cooperation.
TABLE B1.
CO1
CO1

CO2

Correlation table of intended actions—reported
if p < 0.05 and stared if p < 0.01.
CO3

CO4

LO1

LO2

LO3

LO4

BO1

BO2

BO3

BO4

1

CO2 0.3173*

1

CO3
CO4 0.1897*
LO1 0.1596*

1
1
-0.0964* 0.7668*

LO2
LO3

1
1

0.1274 0.2196* 0.5592*

LO4 0.0861* 0.0908*

1

0.0788* 0.6742* 0.5716*

1

BO1 -0.1704* -0.0541 0.0819* -0.1105*

0.4275* 0.3770* 0.3991*

BO2 -0.2474* -0.0721* 0.1326* -0.1121*

0.2281* 0.2856* 0.2490* 0.5300*

BO3 -0.2658*

1
1

0.1302* -0.1859* -0.0989* 0.1674* 0.1985* 0.1390* 0.3830* 0.4906*

1

BO4 -0.3484* -0.1332* 0.1382* -0.2247* -0.1318* 0.1033* 0.0872* 0.0835* 0.3238* 0.5197* 0.4772*

1
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TABLE B2. Comparative factor loadings for all variables
considering various conditions.
a)

Unmatched Weather - Regulation
Variable
CO1
CO2
CO3
CO4
LO1
LO2
LO3
LO4
BO1
BO2
BO3
BO4

b)

With
Pushing Demand Cooperate
Guile Boundaries Money
-0.332

0.3811
0.749
0.3641
0.9357
0.8517

0.5083
0.8143
0.6964
0.673

0.8658
0.6105
0.7802
0.3373

Regulation Matched
Variable
CO1
CO2
CO3
CO4
LO1
LO2
LO3
LO4
BO1
BO2
BO3
BO4

With
Pushing Demand Cooperate
Guile Boundaries Money
0.6258
0.5141
0.8602
0.9276

0.4418
0.6541
0.6406
0.6720

0.7913
0.6289
0.8275
0.3538

2019]
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Weather Matched
With
Pushing Demand Cooperate
Variable
Guile Boundaries Money
CO1
CO2
CO3
CO4
LO1
LO2
LO3
LO4
BO1
BO2
BO3
BO4

d)

49

-0.3842

0.3952
0.5699
0.4365

0.4122
0.8247
0.9465

0.5413
0.8664
0.6602
0.7009

0.7598
0.6076
0.9036
0.3457

Weather Unmatched (Reg-Weather)
Variable
CO1
CO2
CO3
CO4
LO1
LO2
LO3
LO4
BO1
BO2
BO3
BO4

With
Pushing Demand Cooperate
Guile Boundaries Money
-0.6236

0.3286
0.6964
0.3390
0.7924
0.9169

0.4332
0.7807
0.5205
0.8455

0.9200
0.6658
0.7020
0.3201

Impact of Opportunism
Intended Honesty

Factors

on

Trust

and

Respondents with higher “with guile” intended action
scores have a lower disposition to trust (p < 0.001) and lower
intention to act honestly (p < 0.001). They are 6.5 times more
likely to be in the lowest 25% of respondents in regards to
intended honesty and nearly two times more likely to be in
the lowest 25% of respondents in regards to trusting others.
Individuals who act with guile self-report to not be honest
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and not trust others.
However, respondents with the highest likelihood to
push boundaries (factor 2) are not significantly different in
their trust and only slightly less likely to be in the lowest
category of intended honesty.
Where respondents who intend to act with guile do not
trust others and admit to not be honest in their dealings, the
same is not true of those who act with lawful opportunism.
TABLE B3. How outcome factors impact trust and honesty.
Significant odds ratios are reported in bold.a
Factor

High
Low
High Trust Intended Intended Low Trust
Disposition Honesty
Honesty Disposition
Odds
Odds
Odds
Odds
Ratio P>z Ratio P>z Ratio P>z Ratio P>z

High With
Guile 0.45

0.00

0.31

0.00

6.67

0.00

1.90

0.00

High
Pushing
Boundaries 1.02
Factor

0.91

1.18

0.25

0.64

0.01

0.94

0.68

High
Demand 1.67
Money Factor

0.00

1.60

0.00

0.50

0.00

0.77

0.06

High
Cooperate 1.12
Factor

0.43

1.20

0.18

0.71

0.05

0.82

0.20

Male 0.75

0.03

0.98

0.90

1.18

0.26

1.34

0.03

AgeUnder35 0.72

0.02

0.77

0.05

2.06

0.00

0.97

0.81

aAggregated

data across surveys; Analysis of all factors.
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APPENDIX C
The base contracting scenario will be seen by all
respondents and is based on a classic contracting dilemma
around renting a location for a performance. This is a
hypothetical agreement. The respondents read the following:
You produce concerts through your business, and you focus on
festivals. For this year’s Memorial Day Festival, you have reserved
a venue close to the ocean. The Ocean View—an Inn with large
grounds—has offered its grounds in exchange for $6,000: $1,500 as
a deposit and $4,500 one month before the event.
With the venue secured, you then book the infrastructure needed—
security, portable toilets, food vendors, etc.—as well as booking the
acts and you begin to sell tickets.

This scenario is designed to create the potential for real
damages, specifically, the loss of deposits paid to
subcontractors and potential loss of revenue. The
respondents were assigned one of three possible conditions:
a generic condition, null condition, and a specific condition as
follows:
Generic Condition. The following was included: The agreement
provides that if The Ocean View is unable to provide the venue for
any reason, your remedy will be a refund of all amounts paid.
Specific Condition. The following was included: The agreement
provides that in case of a weather event or natural disaster that
makes the festival impossible to hold at the venue, your remedy will
be a refund of all amounts paid.
Null Condition. No condition included.

After reading the scenario and then responding to a
question about their intention to act honestly, one of two
disruption conditions is introduced to respondents—one
concerning a natural disaster (a hurricane) and one
concerning
a
regulatory
change
(environmental
regulation)—which make the event impossible to continue.
Matched Disruption:
It is ten days before the event, and you have already paid the
remaining $4,500, and you sold out the venue’s capacity of 3,000
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tickets. A devastating hurricane has destroyed the shore area
around The Ocean View. You have just received an email from the
owner of The Ocean View:
I have terrible news. This hurricane is even worse than we had
feared. Power lines and telephone lines are down, and water
service has been interrupted. Trees have been downed around the
venue area where the festival would have taken place. Initial
reports from the town government indicate that the venue area
is lowest priority, and as you know, there are enormous amounts
of destruction to attend to. I am afraid there can be no Memorial
Day festival at The Ocean View.
Unmatched Disruption:
It is ten days before the event, and you have already paid the
remaining $4,500, and you sold out the venue’s capacity of 3,000
tickets. You have just received an email from the owner of The
Ocean View:
I have terrible news. The town government has issued new
regulations for wetlands. These regulations include a new map of
town wetlands, and our grounds (along with much of the other
land near the ocean) qualifies as “wetlands.” Under these
regulations no commercial activity whatsoever is permitted on
wetlands. I am afraid there can be no Memorial Day festival at
The Ocean View.

In case of either disruption, the participant will be told:
There is an option available: the state college stadium. However,
the rental fee is an extra $2,000, and you will have no use for the
portable toilets you already paid $1,000 to rent.

